Over the several decades, observers of American politics have noted the sharp increase in partisanship and ideological polarization among members of Congress. While better ideological differentiation may provide voters clearer choices and increase accountability, the results of recent partisan and ideological battles have raised questions about the impact pf polarization on good governance.
Introduction
Over several years many observers of the American political system have lamented the seemingly ever increasing rise of partisanship and ideological divisions in Washington DC. This political polarization has been blamed both for gridlock and a variety of policy and governance failures. Consequently, political scientists been extremely active in their efforts to understand the origins and causes of political polarization as well as how it impacts governance and policymaking.
1 At the same time, journalists and reform activists have also become interested in polarization, especially in terms of what can be done about it.
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Unfortunately, much of the attention has focused on polarization at the national level.
But as Shor and McCarty (2011) what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarized-politics/ .
role of public sector unions. A second reason for focusing polarization at the subnational is that the variation across the states may provide important clues about the causes and consequences of polarization at the national level. But most importantly, the states provide a useful laboratory to discern what reforms may or may not be effective in reducing polarization or mitigating its effects.
In this report, we use the data from Shor and McCarty (2011) , which has been updated and extended through support of the John and Laura Arnold Foundation, to better understand the underlying causes of polarization and to suggest some possible avenues for political reform. We show that aggregate trends and patterns of polarization at the state level tend to match those of the US House and Senate. Given these similarities, we conclude that an examination of the polarization of state legislatures may help shed light on the causes of polarization at the national level. There is substantial variation in the levels in trends in polarization at the state level, however. This variation allows us and other scholars using our data to more precisely identify the political, economic, and social factors that contribute to polarized politics. To this end, we report on several studies that suggest options for political reform or identify potential unintended consequences of popular reform ideas.
This report proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the historical trends in polarization at the national and state levels. Although the Shor-McCarty measures only cover the past fifteen years, the trajectory of polarization of the sate and national levels has been remarkably consistent over that period. In Section 3, we compare the distinct trends in the behavior of Republican and Democratic legislators. At the national level, polarization has been very asymmetric with the Republican party moving right at faster clip than the Democratic party has moved left. The results at the state level are more nuanced. Some regions have witnessed Republican-led asymmetric polarization, but in other cases, the Democrats have polarized more. Section 4 discusses patterns of polarization at the district level. As noted by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2009) , polarization can occur in two ways. First, it might occur through sorting where Republicans begin to win all the conservative districts and Democrats become dominate in all of the liberal districts. Second, it might occur through divergence where Republicans and Democrats represent nearly identical districts in increasingly distinctive ways. We show that divergence is the dominant pattern at both the state and national levels. This finding has important implications for reforms directed at the districting process. In Section 5 we address the common belief that polarization is linked to a decline in inter-party electoral competition. We show that the decline in competitiveness in national and state legislative elections is not as as substantial as commonly believed and may have increased in recent years. Using data from the states, we argue that levels of inter-party competition at the district level is unlikely to influence the level of polarization in the state legislature. Section 6 discusses evidence that polarization at both the national and sate levels is driven in part by changing levels of economic inequality.
In section 7, we discuss current research on polarization in the sates that suggests both the promise and perils of several reform ideas. We focus on three areas: districting, party organization, and campaign finance regulation. In each of these area, scholars have identified important predictors of polarization that in principal could be manipulated by institutional reform. But because these "reforms" may involve important tradeoffs with other political values, we do not present fully formulated policy prposals. But we do hope that the findings can inform the debates around polarization and lead to more evidence-based proposals in the future. There are several points about Figure 1 that are worth noting. The first is that levels of polarization in Congress have varied widely over the past 150 years. In the latter part of the 19th Century following Reconstruction, partisan differences were naturally quite large.
The Trends in Polarization
But the partisan gaps started following around 1920 with the emergence of the Progressive movement which found adherents in both political parties. By the Great Depression and World II partisan differences reached a low point. Reinforced by an emerging coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats, average differences the positions of the parties remained modest until the 1970s. Our current era of increasing polarization began in the middle to late 1970s and was detectable by academics as early as 1982. 4 This fact belies common narratives that pivos on a single event or "great person." The trend precedes the election of Ronald Reagan, the defeated nomination of Robert Bork, the impeachment of Bill Clinton, and the election of Barack Obama. If the year labels of Figure 1 were removed, even the most astute political observers would be hard pressed to locate those events on the figure.
Furthermore, these long-term patterns raise skepticism about the potential efficacy of many proposed reforms. Consider that gerrymandering was less legally constrained, campaign finance less regulated, and primaries more closed during the less polarized 1950s than they are today.
The second takeaway point is that the House and the Senate have remarkably similar histories with respect to polarization. The two time series tend to decline together, stabilize together, and increase together. Generally, there is a little less polarization in the Senate, but there are periods in which the Senate was the more polarized body. Although polarization in the Senate leveled off in the early 2000s, it has increased faster than its has in the House over the past half-dozen years. .6
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Figure 1: Polarization in the U.S. Congress 1877-2014 Computed from DW-NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . The polarization measure is the difference in the mean score for Republicans and the mean score for Democrats.
The similar trajectories of the House and Senate also have implications for evaluating reform ideas. Any compelling reform proposal ought to be one which addresses a mechanism present in both the House and the Senate. For example, Figure 1 casts doubt about the importance of congressional redistricting reform since one cannot blame gerrymandering for Senate polarization.
Standard arguments for the causes of polarization also do not provide much help in explaining the almost identical patterns at the state level. Figure 2 presents the partisan polarization of state legislators using measures developed by (Shor and McCarty 2011) . (Shor and McCarty 2011) . The polarization measure is the difference in the mean score for Republicans and the mean score for Democrats all state legislators serving in lower chambers.
Asymmetric Polarization
Figure 4 presents another historical fact about polarization that is important to account for when discussing reform. Polarization at the national level has been asymmetric. Rather than a pattern where parties moving toward the poles, polarization over the past forty years has been overwhelmingly associated with the increased movement of Republican legislators to the right. Each new Republican cohort has compiled a more conservative record than the returning cohort. Importantly this has been the case since the 1970s, it is not a reflection of the emergence of the "Tea Party" movement.
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The Democratic party has not followed the same pattern. Some new cohorts are more liberal than the returning caucus on average, but many are more moderate. The slight movement of the Democratic party to the left can be almost fully accounted for by the increase of African-American and Latino legislators in its caucus. Outside of "majorityminority" districts that tend to elect ethnic and racial minority legislators, the average position of the Democratic party has changed very little.
The pattern of polarization at the state level has been considerably more symmetric, however. Table 1 shows the average rate of change in the positions of the average lower house legislator for each region and party. Republican movement has considerably greater in the Northeast and North Central while the Democratic movement has been greater in the South and West.
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Party Mean DW-NOMINATE Score In sum, any proposed reform for tackling polarization must account for the fact that Democrats and Republicans represent nearly identical districts in very distinctive ways. As
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2009) argue, a focus on gerrymandering is hard to square with divergence-based polarization. The underlying hypothesis linking gerrymandering to polarization is that politicians draw maps that minimize electoral competition. Thus, if gerrymandering were to be the cause of polarization, the mechanism be through greater sorting. Not only do McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2009) show that the rise of polarization is caused primarily by divergence, they find little evidence of a consistent pattern of sorting rising following the decennial reapportionment. Conversely, the argument that gerrymandering is the cause of polarization provides little explanation as to why Republicans and Democrats would represent moderate districts in increasingly divergent ways.
Polarization and Electoral Competitiveness
Another common belief is that polarization is strongly associated with declining inter-party electoral competition. This assumption is most clearly held by those who propose districting reform. The "gerrymandering" hypothesis discussed above is based on the notion that state legislators draw district boundaries that artificially depress inter-party competition. Without competition from the other party, legislators cater to their bases and extreme interest groups. Arguments about primary election reform also rely on the belief in a lack of interparty competition. If general elections are not competitive, the partisans who dominate the primary electorates have very little reason to nominate '"electable" candidates who appeal to the political center. Despite the widespread belief in declining competition, however, the evidence that legislative elections have become less competitive or that non-competitive elections causes polarization is not very strong.
A common way of measuring the competitiveness of a legislative district is based on the presidential vote share.
9 A district is deemed competitive if its presidential votes are divided roughly equally between the candidates of the two major parties. The underlying premise is that presidential vote share is a good measure of district partisanship. at parity in presidential voting. The evidence of a decline of competitiveness is also not very strong at the state level. Figure 11 replicates Figure 10 but for elections to state lower houses. To account for changing number of legislative seats, the partisan swings are measured in percentage terms.
Clearly, the pattern of partisan swings in state legislatures mirror that of the US House.
There is a long term decline in the magnitude of the swings, but much of it predates the era of growing polarization. Over the period for which we can measure state level polarization, the magnitude of the partisan swings is on the rise. This does not suggest a strong relationship between inter-party competition and polarization. 1936 1944 1952 1960 1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 2016 Absolute Swing Three Election Average Using the Shor and McCarty (2011) data on state level polarization, we can go further in asking whether there is a cross-sectional relationship between the level of popularization and the degree of inter-party competition at the district level. We consider whether the number of state lower house districts that are competitive at the presidential level correlate with the level of polarization observed in the lower house. Column 3 of Table 2 presents the simple correlation for three presidential elections between lower house polarization and percentage of a state's districts with a presidential vote margin of less than 10%. If low levels of inter-party competition at the district level produced higher levels of legislative polarization, we would expect to see a negative and statistically significant correlation for each election. There is a negative correlation, however, for only one election. But the magnitude is very small and the p-value indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between inter-party district-level competition and polarization. The only statistically significant correlation is for 2008 where the correlation is positive. In sum, these data do not suggest that district-level electoral competitiveness affects polarization at the legislative level.
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In summary, the evidence does not support the widely held notion that polarization has resulted from a lack of inter-party competition at the constituency level. Standard measures of competitiveness based on presidential vote appear to be driven by the particularities of the the presidential elections rather than aspects of the allocation of voters across districts while competitiveness measured by seat swings does not appear to have declined. Evidence from state legislatures finds no impact of district-level competitiveness on polarization. These empirical facts call into question the underlying arguments used to support reforms to redistricting and primary institutions. Given the lack of support for the underlying premises, it is not surprising that such little evidence has been mustered from the direct effects of gerrymandering or partisan primaries on reform.
Polarization and Inequality
While changes in electoral competition especially those presumed to be influenced by legislative districting have limited power to explain terns and patterns in polarization, there is considerable evidence that polarization may be affected by longer term changes in the American economy and society.
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) .38
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Unfortunately, the Gini index is available only back to the 1940s so Figure 13 uses a different measure of inequality, the share of income going to the top 1% of taxpayers as computed by Piketty and Saez (2003) and subsequently updated. The use of this extended measure shows that high polarization and high inequality tend to move roughly in tandem going back at least as far as the introduction of the income tax.
Despite this suggestive evidence, scholars have not been able to precisely asses the extent to which income inequality causes polarization. First, the relationship might be the other way around so that polarization causes inequality through its impact on the policymaking capacity of the federal government. Indeed there is some suggestion of such an effect in Figure 13 as polarization appears to lead changes in the top income share especially during the first part of the 20th Century. Second, it is also possible that the relationship between inequality and polarization as would be the case if both were caused by some third factor. Percentage Share 1 9 1 3 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 7 1 9 4 5 1 9 5 3 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 3 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 9
Income share of top 1% Polarization index But recently Voorheis, McCarty and Shor (2015) use data from Shor and McCarty (2011) and Voorheis (2014) to test for a causal relationship between inequality and polarization in the states. 14 They find that that income inequality has a large, positive and statistically significant effect on political polarization. Economic inequality appears to cause state Democratic parties to become more liberal. Inequality, however, moves state legislatures to the right overall. Such findings suggest that the effect of income inequality impacts polarization by replacing moderate Democratic legislators with Republicans.
14 Because this study can leverage variation across states and over time, it is less susceptible to biases caused by omitted variables. Moreover, they use a statistical procedure to minimize the effects of reverse causation.
These findings about the link between polarization and inequality suggest that our political divisions are in a large degree related to deeper social and economic changes. So tackling political polarization may require policies designed to target economic inequality and economic growth for the middle and working classes. Yet polarization negatively impacts the capacity of policymakers to deal with those problems.
Reform Avenues
While the evidence discussed above suggests deeper roots of polarization casts considerable doubt about many of the most popular remedies, recent work using the data from Shor and
McCarty (2011) suggests that there may be some opportunities for policies and reforms that might mitigate polarization.
Drawing on this work, we outline three possible policy approaches to polarization: homogenize legislative districts, strengthen parties, and regulate individual campaign contributions (but not necessarily corporate contributions). Many observers will find these recommendations to be counter-intuitive if not perverse. Clearly, there may be other normative considerations unrelated to polarization that may make these reforms undesirable. So our point is not to advocate for such changes, but to demonstrate the complex trade offs and potential unintended consequences of electoral reform targeted at polarization.
Creating Homogeneous Electorates
For those who contend that declining district-level inter-party competition is a cause of polarization, the answer is to create more heterogeneous districts. Such districts would be more likely to swing back and forth between Democratic and Republican representatives and would therefore induce competition that would reduce the chances of electing an extreme legislator.
Existing political science research, however, questions the wisdom of heterogeneous legislative districts. Brunell (2010) argues that heterogeneous districts maximize the average preference divergence between citizens and their representative. To support this argument, he
shows that citizens in competitive legislative districts report less satisfaction with Congress. (2004) Recently, we and some collaborators have added to the evidence against heterogeneous districts by demonstrating how such districts produce greater levels of partisan divergence.
Gerber and Lewis
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Our argument is that heterogeneity creates greater levels of electoral uncertainty. Such uncertainty weakens the centripetal incentives toward convergence and allows policy-motivated candidates to pursue policy goals that diverge from the preferences of the median voter. 16 See also Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983) .
position of over 350,000 respondents. With such a large sample, we are able to estimate the political heterogeneity of each senate district as the standard deviation of the respondents' policy positions.
17 First, we demonstrate that polarization in a state senate is strongly related to the average preference heterogeneity of its districts. Figure 14 plots the state average of our measure of heterogeneity against the difference in party medians derived from the Shor-McCarty ideal points. The figure reveals a strong positive correlation between the average district heterogeneity and the polarization of the state senate. This correlation is just as large as the correlation between polarization and the variation of median ideal points across districts.
Thus, the variation of voter preferences within districts matters as much as the variation across districts.
Unlike many arguments about polarization that are predicated on ideological sorting across districts, our argument explicitly predicts that the link between polarization and district heterogeneity operates through divergence. Thus, our primary empirical finding is that Republicans and Democrats represent heterogeneous districts in divergent ways. Figure 15 demonstrates this point. The sample of state senate districts is divided into three groups based on the standard deviation of citizen preferences. For each group, the Shor-McCarty ideal points are plotted against the mean voter preference. Clearly, as one moves form the least heterogeneous districts to the most heterogeneous districts, the gap between Democratic and Republican legislators grows at each level of citizen preference.
17 We replicate our analysis for the U.S. House and for state lower chambers. The results for the U.S.
House are very similar. The results for state lower chambers are somewhat weaker because our measures of heterogeneity are far less precise at that level. The upshot of these findings is that a primary objective of redistricting should be to create legislative districts where the vast majority of the citizens share common political preferences. Achieving this goal will likely require greater deference to existing municipal and administrative boundaries as well as the relaxation of compactness constraints so that similar communities can be connected together into districts despite often unfavorable geographic residential patterns.
Strengthening Party Organization
The academic literature and public discussions of legislative polarization in the United States often conflates polarization and partisanship. 20 . This confusion arises naturally because the two phenomena are hard to distinguish empirically. For example, it is very difficult to discern whether those increased partisan differences in legislative behavior reflect true ideological changes or simply increased intra-party cooperation and inter-party conflict. Given the difficulty of distinguishing, scholars often use the terms polarization and partisanship almost interchangeably.
This conflation of polarization and partisanship is relevant for discussions of political reform. Many popular prescriptions for reducing polarization call for decreasing the role of political parties. But if polarization in the United States is the consequence of relatively weak parties rather than strong parties, as I argue may be the case, then such reforms will be counter-productive.
To illustrate, consider two scenarios. The first is one with strong legislative parties.
Assume that parties are so strong that they behave as unitary actors. The second scenario is one where parties are very weak. The organizations and leaders impose no discipline on candidates and therefore party labels convey no information to voters.
The strong party scenario perfectly conforms to the model of Anthony Downs. 21 In his model,unified political parties have very strong incentives to converge to the median voter.
Any party that fails to position itself in the political center will be defeated by one that does. But when parties are weaker, they screen candidates imperfectly. For such parties, Snyder and Ting obtain a distinct prediction. That such parties cannot screen out relatively more extreme candidates forces them to position themselves away from the median voter.
Thus, weak parties will take divergent positions. Consequently, Republican candidates will tend to win conservative districts and Democratic candidates will win the liberal districts.
Consequently, there will be considerable polarization in equilibrium.
So polarization is only obtained in an "anti-Goldilocks" case where the parties are not too strong nor too weak. So the question of how to best reform the party system to reduce polarization is an empirical one -would reducing the influence of party organization reduce 22 Snyder Jr and Ting (2002) .
polarization as some would claim, or would it move us toward the anti-Goldilocks point with higher polarization. If the latter, a reform agenda designed to reduce polarization should strive to strengthen the role of party organizations both by enhancing their role in the selection and discipline of candidates and giving them an enhanced capacity to withstand the pressure of extreme interest groups and voters.
To evaluate the effect of party organization on polarization, we draw upon and extend the work of Krimmel (2013) who argues that the national parties polarized at least in part because they were forced to turn increasingly to organized interests for resources as traditional partisan resources such as patronage declined. In addition to historical and archival evidence for this change in partisan strategy, Krimmel provides some quantitative evidence that there is lower legislative polarization in states that have historically strong party organizations.
Specifically, she finds a strong negative correlation between state legislative polarization as measured by Shor and McCarty (2011) and David Mayhew's measure of "traditional party organizations" (TPO). are largely autonomous from candidates and outside interests 2) have longevity 3) use hierarchical structures 4) try to influence nominations for office and 5) rely substantially more on "material" incentives than on "purposive" incentives. That Mayhew's ratings pertain to the situation in the states during the late Sixties has the advantage of making them plausibly exogenous to contemporary levels of polarization.
negative relationship between polarization and historical strength of party organizations in the state.
To further explore the relationship between polarization and party strength, we use multiple regression to control for other variables that might impact polarization. The dependent variable of each model is either a polarization measure or a measure of the position of a party's legislative delegation. All of these data are drawn from Shor and McCarty (2011) .
The main independent variable is Mayhew's TPO measure. We include a small set of control variables. First, we include Year to capture the trend toward greater polarization. We also include an indicator South to capture regional variation in both polarization and the prevalence of traditional party organizations. Data on Percent African-American and Income Inequality (the Gini coefficient of family income) are also included. Shor and McCarty (2011) . The Measure of Traditional Party Organization is from Mayhew (1986) . McCarty (2015) reports the estimates of these models for lower and upper chambers, respectively. In both models, states with a recent history of traditional party organization have less legislative polarization than those that do not. States with traditional party organizations have differences in party medians that are about 0.4 lower than states with weaker party organizations. The magnitude of this effect is equivalent to a one-standard deviation reduction in polarization and two-thirds of the inter-quartile range. So the correlation of party organization and polarization is both large and statistically significant. Importantly, the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for region, economic inequality, and racial composition. So the take away is that most academic observers, journalists, and activists share a too simplistic view of the relationship between party organizations. This view tends to blame polarization on a strengthening of political parties. Instead, the opposite view is better supported empirically. Perhaps instead of sidelining parties in the nomination process and campaign finance system, we should be enhancing the role of parties. While America's anti-party political culture may preclude any explicit attempt to strengthen parties, it is important to remember that any tinkering of the campaign finance system, congressional rules, primary nomination systems, or redistricting may have unintended consequences related to weakening parties. But recent research has found much more promising evidence for a different channel through which campaign finance may affect polarization -increased contribution activity by ideological individuals. While growth contributions by political action committee contributions has been relatively flat, contributions from individual citizens have been growing dramatically. Candidates have become correspondingly more reliant on individual contributions. Barber (2014) reports that the median federal candidate now obtains 80% of her funds from individual donors, up from only 20% two decades ago.
25 Moreover, Barber (2014) and Bonica (2014) 
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Tackling polarization through campaign finance reform involves a significant dilemma.
As Bonica et al. (2013) shows, small donors are considerably more ideological and extreme than larger donors. While some large donors such as Charles Koch or George Soros have very clear ideological agendas, many wealthy contributors are more centrist and pragmatic 28 Consistent with this finding, Barber also shows that tighter contribution limits lead to small contributions on average and more donors "maxing out" with a contribution at the legal limit.
29 Of course, there may be many reasons unrelated to polarization for tightening restrictions on corporate and labor union money.
and employ strategies similar to corporations. Smaller contributors, however, are more likely to allocate their donations according to ideological criteria. Consequently, if reformers want to target polarization, small donors should be targeted at the expense of large donors. But those who wish to target an ever increasing source of political inequality should do the opposite.
Conclusions
Successful reforms must be based on a foundation of good evidence. Academic research can play a more central part in the debates about how to improve democracy and governance in the United States. Clearly, political scientists need to do more to engage and communicate our ideas and findings. My hope is that this article contributes to that endeavor.
31
Unfortunately, those who tout certain reform ideas as solutions to polarization often dismiss social scientific evidence. Instead, they prefer to rely on intuitions based on their preconceptions about the underlying causes of polarization. This is not a fruitful approach to promoting fundamental reform of our democratic institutions. The mixture of social, economic, and strategic considerations that underlie the creation of our partisan and ideological divisions are too complex to be reduced to simplistic analysis and common sense.
Even reformers who accept social scientific evidence often believe that it is beside the point. The argue that bipartisan redistricting commissions, non-partisan primaries, and curbs on corporate spending are good ideas independent of any affect on polarization. Undoubtedly, it is true that there are good non-polarization arguments in favor of these and many other reforms. Those are the arguments that should be made. Marketing ideas on undeliverable benefits is surely the best way to undermine reform efforts.
31 See Mansbridge and Martin (2013) and Persily (2015b) for other laudatory efforts.
